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Abstract 
This paper proposes a neo-Schumpeterian model in order to discuss how the mechanisms of entry 
and exit contribute to industry productivity growth in alternative technological regimes. By 
assuming a) that firms learn about the technology through a variety of sources, and b) a continuous 
flow of entry and exit, our numerical simulation exercise does show that exits and contraction take 
mostly place among less productive firms, while entry and expansion are concentrated among the 
more efficient ones. We were also able to replicate the fact that the entry-exit effect is larger in the 
entrepreneurial regime, while the contribution of continuing firms is larger in the routinized regime. 
Our model was thus very effective in replicating some major empirical regularities of industry 
dynamics, including the very prominent role of entry and exit in productivity growth. Our analysis 
also suggests that micro analysis is the proper complement to aggregate industry studies, as it 
provides a considerable insight into the causes of productivity growth. 
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“Developing the conceptual models of heterogeneity in behavior, reallocation, and lumpy adjustment at the 
micro level and, in turn, considering the aggregate implications, should be a high priority.” 
Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001) 
 
1. Introduction 
 In the past few years the study of productivity issues has greatly shifted towards the 
understanding of the operation of micro units, with a particular emphasis on establishment (firm)-
level reallocation. It is indeed believed that a large percentage of aggregate (industry) productivity 
growth can be solely imputed to mobility of firms, with low-productivity firms losing market share 
(or shutting down) in favour of more productive incumbents and new entrants. 
 This study proposes a neo-Schumpeterian model in which the role of firm dynamics on 
industry evolution is extensively modelled. In a new departure from the original Nelson-Winter 
evolutionary industry model (Nelson and Winter, 1982; and Winter, 1984), which was mostly 
focused on technological change, we examine how the mechanisms of entry and exit contribute to 
industry productivity growth. A central hypothesis in our approach is that the aggregate productivity 
growth of an industry is driven by the development of micro units, and that the changes in 
productivity of individual firms are non uniform, which leads to strong heterogeneity across firms 
and to an intense mechanism of entry and exit. 
 One key aspect of our modelling is the full characterization of the technological regime in 
which firms operate. Two raw cases are considered: the ‘routinized regime’ and the ‘entrepreneurial 
regime’. We develop a competitive dynamic framework of an industry composed by heterogeneous 
firms and by continuing entry and exit. The learning process can take different forms. Following the 
taxonomy proposed by Malerba (1992), firms can learn through ‘learning by doing’ and ‘learning 
by using’ on the one hand, and ‘learning by searching’ and ‘learning from external sources’ on the 
other. 
 The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers a brief review of the empirical literature 
on firm entry and exit and on firm productivity dynamics. Section 3 develops a neo-Schumpeterian 
model of industrial dynamics. Section 4 implements Lsd numerical simulations, with a particular 
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emphasis on the sensitivity analysis of the results with respect to key model parameters. The main 
goal of the exercise is to evaluate to what extent our modelling strategy can replicate some stylized 
facts on industry dynamics and productivity growth summarized in Section 2. Section 5 contains the 
concluding remarks. 
 The numerical simulation exercise shows that exits and contraction take mostly place 
among less productive firms, while entry and expansion are concentrated among the more efficient 
ones. It is therefore quite clear that firm mobility plays a substantial role on aggregate productivity 
growth. We were also able to replicate the fact that the entry-exit effect is larger in the 
entrepreneurial regime, while the contribution of continuing firms is larger in the alternative 
(routinized) regime. To summarize, it seems that our modelling strategy was very effective in 
replicating some major empirical regularities of industry dynamics, including the very prominent 
role of entry and exit on aggregate productivity growth. 
 
2. Firm dynamics and industry productivity growth: some facts 
 Studies in several countries indicate that entry and exit flows of firms are very substantial 
(Caves, 1998; Geroski, 1995). In the U.K. manufacturing sector, for example, the (annual) entry and 
exit rates were about 6.5% and 5.1%, respectively, in the period 1974-79. In Canada, between 1970 
and 1982, the corresponding rates were 4.9 and 6.5%. Moreover, these rates vary substantially 
across industries – for example, the entry rate fluctuated from 3.5% to 9.6% across the U.K. (two-
digit) sectors. 
 Entry and exit also tend to be highly positively correlated. The main reason is of course that 
the rate of early mortality is very high for entrants. In Canada, the hazard rate for 1971 entrants was 
about 10% at the end of the first year (roughly, twice as much as for incumbent firms). In the U.K., 
19% of new firms established in 1974 exited within the following two years, while 51% did not 
survive longer than five years (Geroski, 1991; Baldwin, 1995). 
 In contrast, the growth rate among successful entrants is very high. On average, surviving 
new plants double their initial size after six to seven years (Mata et al., 1995), although successful 
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entrants may take more than a decade to achieve the average size of established firms (Audretsch 
and Mata, 1995).1 
 The relationship between industry dynamics and firms’ characteristics (e.g. size, age, 
technological environment, and innovation) is also an important one (Geroski, 1995; Caves, 1998). 
The technological environment, for example, seems to impact the entry rate, while profits do not 
(Geroski, 1994; Dosi and Lovallo, 1997). Acs and Audretsch (1990) and Geroski (1994) have 
observed a positive (although modest) correlation between entry and innovation rates, suggesting 
that a more innovative environment encourages entry. Indeed, entry seems to be more intense in an 
environment providing potential entrants with greater opportunities to innovate, while the greater is 
the total amount of innovative activity and intensity of R&D, the higher seems to be the entry 
barriers. Audretsch and Acs (1994) observed, in particular, that the entry rates were lower among 
prototypal routinized regime industries than among industries characterized by the entrepreneurial 
regime.2 
 The influence of technological environment and innovation on the ability of new firms to 
survive has also been examined in the literature. Audretsch (1991), using the United States data on 
new manufacturing firms (i.e. created in 1976), found that an increase in the capacity of small and 
new firms to innovate leads to a higher survival rate, especially in the entrepreneurial regime. In the 
routinized regime, where the ability of small firms to innovate is relatively low, the survival rate 
tends to be smaller. Another important regularity is that firm’s growth rate decreases with size and 
age, while survivability increases with the same arguments (Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003; Evans, 
1987). 
 The technological environment influences market turbulence (i.e. market share instability) 
as well (Dosi et al., 1995). For U.S. firms (1976-80), Audretsch and Acs (1990) found that 
turbulence was higher in industries characterised by the entrepreneurial regime. Turbulence was 
                                                     
1 An entrant is typically very small – in the United States, for example, an entrant over the period 1963-82 
only produces in the entry year, on average, 35.2% of the incumbents’ output level (Dunne et al., 1988). 
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indeed higher in industries where small firms were able to implement a strategy of innovation and 
lower in industries where they were less able to innovate. Davies and Geroski (1997) in turn 
observed that turbulence in the top five U.K. firms (in 1979 and 1986) tend to increase with R&D 
intensity, but the characteristics of this specific sample of firms make the comparison a difficult 
one. Surprisingly enough, Audretsch and Acs (1990) found that there is more, not less, turbulence in 
concentrated industries.3 
 Finally, the dynamics of firms is expected to lead to a higher aggregate productivity growth, 
with changes in industry-level productivity arising either from within-firm productivity growth (for 
example, due to technological changes or human capital improvements), or from resource 
reallocation (i.e. entry and exit of firms; see Carreira and Teixeira, 2008). Baily et al. (1992), for
example, found that the contribution of  increasing  output  shares  of  high-productivity  continuing 
plants was the most important source of the U.S. industry productivity growth, while the entry-exit 
effect was found to be very small.  For its part, Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001) found that 
net entry plays a significant role in the medium and long term, with resource reallocation 
accounting for half of manufacturing productivity growth, of which about 18% was due to the net 
entry effect. These results were corroborated by Baldwin (1995) who has shown that, in the 1970s, 
firm dynamics contributed substantially to the Canadian (labour) productivity growth – around 40% 
to 50% of productivity growth was estimated to have been due to firm dynamics, with 37% of the 
employment share being transferred from exiting and contracting plants to entering and expanding 
plants.4 
                                                                                                                                                                 
2 The full definition of technological regimes is given in Section 3 below. 
3 For a given concentration index, more turbulence suggests the presence of a higher degree of competition. 
4 The role of firm mobility on productivity growth was not confirmed, for example, by Griliches and Regev 
(1995). Their analysis of Israeli industry (1979-88) shows that a larger proportion of aggregate labour 
productivity growth is due to productivity changes within firms rather than to their mobility. It is nevertheless 
worthwhile mentioning that the time period considered is much shorter (three-year periods in their analysis). 
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3. The model 
 The empirical regularities outlined in the previous section are at the root of our modelling 
strategy. Our model draws on Nelson-Winter evolutionary industry model (1982: ch. 12; Winter, 
1984), with two main novelties: a) a greater focus on the learning process – firms can learn about 
technology through a variety of sources: ‘learning by doing’, ‘learning by using’, ‘learning by 
searching’, and ‘learning from external sources’; Malerba, 1992; and b) a more direct and detailed 
modelling of entry and exit of firms. 
 Let us assume, at time ‘zero’, a ‘mature’ industry made up of a finite number of competitors 
producing a single and homogeneous product. All individual technologies exhibit constant returns 
to scale, with output equal to full capacity. Input supplies are perfectly elastic and input pries are 
exogenously given and constant over time. 
 Figure 1 shows the main structure of the model. In each period the state of production 
technologies across firms determine the output level and the market price. Then, once firms R&D 
investment is made (and assuming their R&D activities are successful in innovating or imitating), 
they decide whether to stick with the current technology or engage on technological changes in the 
next period. Once firms learn about their performance, they decide firstly on the future R&D effort 
and secondly whether to continue or exit, while new firms enter in the market. 
 
3.1. Production, costs and profits 
Given product homogeneity, firms choose quantities rather than prices. Quite naturally, more 
productive firms (i.e. with a competitive cost advantage) are expected to gain market share, while 
less productive firms will be expected to lose market share (or forced to exit). 
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Figure 1: Structure of the model 
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 In particular, the production level of firm i at time t, { }1, , ti I n∈ = … , is given by: 
( )qittiit gqq += − 1)1( , (1) 
where qitg  is a modified version of the ‘replicator dynamic’ proposed by Metcalfe (1998: ch. 2), 
defined as (assuming a zero growth rate for the entire market demand):5 
( 1)
1q itit
t
cg
c
δ
−
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, (2) 
where cit denotes the production cost per unit of output of firm i at time t, tc  is the average of the 
firms’ unit costs weighted by the corresponding market share its  ( ∑== tni ititt csc 1  and Stitit Qqs = ). 
δ  is the intensity of the selection mechanism. Clearly, given equation (1), we have qitg  ≥ -1, with 
1−=qitg  being equivalent to closure. In turn, the higher is δ, the stronger is the adjustment 
mechanism. We allow δ being firm- or industry-specific on the one hand, and constant or time-
variant on the other. Within this context, a firm’s growth rate is higher (lower) than the market 
average if its unit cost is lower (higher) than the average cost of the established firms. 
 In each period, firm i is characterised by the production function:6 
it
m
it
m
itititit uxaxaq ),,(min
11 …= , (3) 
                                                     
5 The replicator dynamic equation was originally introduced into mathematical biology by R.A. Fisher. It was 
Silverberg (1987) who extended it to competition among firms. Silveberg’s replicator equation relates each 
firm’s market share to the difference between its competitiveness and the industry’s average competitiveness 
(see also Silverberg, 1988). In the Metcalfe model, the growth rate depends on the absolute difference 
between individual unit costs and the corresponding industry average. 
6 For simplicity, our implementation assumes just two inputs. We note that the Nelson and Winter model 
(1982: ch. 12) assumes Leontief technologies, with each firm i at time t using the inputs in a given proportion. 
Since the Leontief technology forces the same complementary across inputs, the cost of variable inputs is 
constant across firms and over time. The techniques in the Nelson and Winter model are thus characterised by 
Hicks’ neutral technical changes, with technical progress leading to proportional reductions in all inputs. In 
our case, although we assume a Leontief technology, we will allow for differences in productivity changes 
across inputs. 
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where qit  is firm's output at time t, jitx  is firm's demand of the jth input, 
j
ita  ( 0>jita ) is the 
productivity of input j (i.e. the amount of output produced per unit of input j under maximum 
efficiency), and uit is an index of firm’s production competence in the use of its technique, given by 
firm’s productive efficiency level at time t (i.e. Maxit itu q q= , where Maxq  represents the best-
practice of firm’s technique; 0 < uit ≤ 1). 
 The corresponding amount of inputs is given by: 
j
it
it
it
j
it a
q
u
x 1= , (4) 
and the unit production cost of this technology is given by: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∑ =mj j
it
j
it
it a
w
u
c 1
1 , (5) 
where w j is the price of the jth input.  
In this framework, a change in firm’s unit cost arises from technical progress (i.e. changes 
in parameters jita ) and from improvement of efficiency (i.e. changes in parameter uit). When either 
j
ita  or uit increase (decrease), the unit cost decreases (increases), as 0)()(
21 <−=∂∂ − jititjjitit auwac  
and 0)()( 1
12 <−=∂∂ ∑ = −− mj jitjititit awuuc . 
 Industry output at time t is given by the sum of the firms’ output levels: 
∑== tni itSt qQ 1 . (6) 
 We assume that the industry faces a decreasing continuous (inverse) demand function: 
)( Dtt QDP = , (7) 
where Pt  is the market price and DtQ  denotes the market demand at time t, with 
∞<→ )(lim 0 DtQ QDDt  and 0)(lim =∞→ DtQ QDDt . In each period, equilibrium in the product market 
determines the market price at time t, that is, )( Stt QDP = . 
 The profit of firm i at time t is equal to total sales minus production and R&D costs: 
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[ ] itittitit qcPr −−= )1(π , (8) 
where rit is the R&D expenditure rate per unit of sales (0 ≤ rit < 1). 
 
3.2. The learning process 
Learning and adapting over time is a key aspect to survivability, but routines are usually hard to 
change, and are responsible for inflexibility and inertia in organisational behaviour. Routines do 
change, however, as new knowledge is incorporated within the transmission of firm’s knowledge 
over time (Metcalfe 1998). 
 Firms can learn through a diversity of sources of knowledge. Following Malerba (1992), we 
assume different types of firm’s learning: ‘learning by doing’ and ‘by using’ (i.e. learning that 
emerges from production activity and from the use of products, machinery, and inputs), ‘learning 
from advances in science and technology’ and ‘from inter-industry spillovers’ (i.e. learning 
resulting from the exploitation of external sources of knowledge), and ‘learning by searching’ (i.e. 
learning that is related to research made within the firm). In our model firms can improve their 
productivity level via any of these three channels in the way described below.  
 Furthermore, it is assumed that improvements in the technological level are always 
achieved through learning (disembodied change), and not by investments in new, more productive 
equipment (embodied change). In other words, an improvement in technology always corresponds 
to a better knowledge of the production process, not to a replacement of the capital stock.7 
 Efficiency gains in the use of production technology result in our model from ‘learning by 
doing’ and from ‘learning by using’. It is a continuous and cumulative process rather than the result 
of any deliberate R&D activity. We consider however that these two types of learning are 
conditioned in the following way: (i) the learning process is limited by the maximum efficiency of 
the technique used (i.e. the best-practice); and (ii) when a new technology is introduced the previous 
                                                     
7 For a model with vintage capital, see, for example, Silverberg et al. (1988). In our case, we assume that the 
capital stock is fully transferable from one technology to another. 
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productive knowledge is partly discarded (the technology-specific knowledge component). Thus, uit 
can be written as: 
1 ik ikvitu e
τ−= − , (9) 
where τik is the number of periods during which firm i uses the technology k, and vik is a firm-
specific parameter that denotes the learning speed. A smaller value of vik implies a slower learning 
process. 
 Before describing the changes in production parameters jita , which, by assumption are 
obtained via innovation or imitation, we need to characterize two main alternative technological 
regimes. Indeed, we consider the concept of ‘technological regime’, introduced by Nelson and 
Winter (1977), as the key tool to understanding innovative activity. Two kinds of Schumpeterian 
regimes are thus distinguished. The entrepreneurial regime – a ‘science-based’ technology regime 
relatively favourable to new and innovative firms – and the routinized regime – a ‘cumulative’ 
technological regime that facilitates innovation from (large) established firms (Nelson and Winter 
1982; Winter 1984).8 In the entrepreneurial regime, the improvements in the current state of 
technological knowledge are mainly due to the new firms, while in the routinized regime such 
improvements are mostly associated to the established ones. In a ‘science-based’ technology, firms 
accumulate their own technological knowledge base from sources of knowledge external to the firm 
(for example, from public research institutions and from industry spillovers), and therefore 
technology is characterised by a broad and universal knowledge base. In a ‘cumulative’ 
technological regime, however, the sources of knowledge are internal to the firm and as a 
consequence the barriers to entry tend to be substantially higher. 
 In the routinized regime, it is assumed that more productive technologies are obtained, 
either by innovating new production processes or by mimicking the ones pre-existing within the 
                                                     
8 These two regimes are often referred to as ‘Schumpeter Mark I’ and ‘Schumpeter Mark II’ (Malerba and 
Orsenigo, 1995), by analogy with Schumpeter’s conceptions of the innovative firms developed in The Theory 
of Economic Development (1934) and in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942). 
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industry. Following again the taxonomy introduced by Malerba (1992), in the former case, 
established firms adopt a ‘learning by searching’ process which is internal to the firm and mainly 
related to R&D activities; in the latter, firms adopt a ‘learning from inter-industry spillovers’ 
process, which is external to the firm and related to current industry knowledge. The capacity of a 
firm to absorb external knowledge also depends on its R&D activities (‘absorptive capacity of 
firms’, after Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 1990). 
 We assume R&D investments are an increasing function of sales, and they can be either 
innovative ( NitR ) or imitative (
M
itR ), as follows: 
ittiti
N
it qPrR α= , (10) 
( ) ittitiMit qPrR α−= 1 , (11) 
where αi is a firm-specific parameter denoting the share allocated to innovation, 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 (if αi is 
near to 1, the firm is a strong innovator), and rit is the R&D expenditure rate. 
 Innovative and imitative knowledge are then accumulated as follows: 
( )( 1) 1N N N N Nit i i t i itZ Z Rθ θ−= + − , (12) 
( )( 1) 1M M M M Mit i i t i itZ Z Rθ θ−= + − , (13) 
where NitZ  and 
M
itZ  are the innovative and imitative stock of knowledge of firm i at time t, 
respectively, and Niθ  and Miθ  are firm-specific parameters weighting past research (0 < Niθ < 1 and 
0 < Miθ < 1). 
 The quality (i.e. the probability of success) of R&D activities depends on both past and 
current R&D investment. We have modelled technological change as a three-stage process. The first 
stage determines whether a firm’s R&D activities result in innovation or imitation in the current 
period. This is established by random variables dN  and dM  (the subscripts N and M denote 
innovation and imitation, respectively) which is equal to one (success) or zero (failure). A firm’s 
probability of success in innovation/imitation is an exponential function of the stock of knowledge: 
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( )Pr 1 1 −= = − NN itb ZNd e , (14) 
( )Pr 1 1 −= = − MM itb ZMd e , (15) 
where bN  and bM  are industry-specific exogenous parameters of technological opportunities for 
innovative and imitative success, respectively. 
 We assume that innovative draws are based on the current input productivity level which 
means that each firm follows its own technological path. Thus, in the second stage, if a firm is 
successful in innovating (dN = 1), the resulting input productivities are determined by a log normal 
distribution with a log mean ( )ln 1µ ⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦j j jit it itg a  and standard deviation σ . That is: 
( )2,~ln σµ jitjNit Na , (16) 
where jitg  ( 0>jitg ) is the rate of productivity growth associated with innovation and it is 
stochastically determined.  
 A successful imitation (dM = 1) means that the firm learns about a subset of past production 
techniques available in the industry and is able to converge to the best practice. Formally, the firm 
chooses the technique with the lowest unit production cost: 
( )( )( 1) ( 1) ( )( 1)min ; ; ; ; ; ;Mt h l t h t h l tc c c c− − − + −=   … … … … , (17) 
where ∑ == mj jhtjht awc 1~ , h ∈ I. In this case, firms follow the path of the most efficient competitor 
(with one lag). 
 Finally, the firm has to choose, for the next period, between Nitc~ , 
M
tc~ and the current 
technique, itc~ , given by: 
( )MtNititti cccc ~;~;~min~ )1( =+ , (18) 
where ∑ == mj jNitjNit awc 1~ . The firm then defines the new vector of input productivities 
( )mtij titi aaa )1()1(1 )1( ;;;; +++ ……  for the next period. 
 14
 In the entrepreneurial regime, it is assumed that more productive technologies are obtained 
from an innovation process that depends mostly on external sources of knowledge. Since, by 
definition, firms learn from external ‘advances in science and technology’, the technology is mostly 
non-cumulative. But it is assumed that the capacity of a firm to absorb external knowledge depends 
on the level of the R&D effort (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 1990). 
 As in the routinized regime, we have modelled the innovation process as a three-stage 
process. In the first stage, it is determined whether firm’s R&D activities result in innovation; the 
second stage gives the change in input productivity; finally, the firm chooses between the old and 
new technique (thus, we recover equations (10) to (18), with αi = 1 to preclude the possibility of 
imitation). If a firm is successful in innovating (dN = 1), the technique upgrade is then given by a log 
normal distribution, but centred around the industry’s average productivity in the period t-1, that is, 
( ) ( 1)ln 1j j jit it i tg aµ −⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦ , where ∑== tni jititjt asa 1  is the average industry input productivity 
weighted by the corresponding market shares. The assumption that innovative draws are based on 
average industry input productivity levels translates the idea that the innovative process is largely 
non-cumulative, with all firms following more or less directly the industry technological path. 
 
3.3. R&D effort for the next period 
Having selected the technique to use in the next period, firms have then to decide on the R&D 
investment for the next period. This is modelled in two stages. As a first step, firms determine 
whether they want to adjust its level of R&D investment towards the industry average. This 
decision is made by comparing the performance (i.e. the net present value) of each firm and the 
industry average. A firm will decide to increment the R&D expenditures if its net present value is 
lower than the industry average, that is, if Vit > Vt . The net present value of an established firm with 
an infinite horizon and a constant discount rate (v), is given by: 
( )1 1 ( )it it itV Eτ ττπ ν π∞ −= += + +∑ , (19) 
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where E(πiτ) is the expected profit in period t. ( )ˆ ˆ( ) 1i it itE gπτπ π= + , where ( )( 1)ˆ ˆ 1it i t itπ ρ π ρ π−= + −  
and πitgˆ  is the average profit growth rate given by ( )( 1)ˆ ˆ 1it i t itg g gπ π πϕ ϕ−= + − , if 0ˆ >πitg , or 0ˆ =πitg  
otherwise. ϕ  and ρ are weighting parameters, with ϕ, ρ ∈]0,1[. 
 Equation (19) can then be written: 
ˆ ˆ, for ,
ˆ
ˆ ˆ, for and 0,
ˆ ˆ, for and 0,
ˆ, for 0.
it
it it it
it
it it it
it it it
it it it
V g v
v g
V g v
V g v
V
π
π
π
π
ππ
π
π
π π
⎧ = + <⎪ −⎪⎪ = +∞ ≥ >⎨⎪ = −∞ ≥ <⎪⎪ = =⎩
 (20) 
 The average net present value of the industry is given by: 
( )1 ( )t tV Eτ ττ ν π∞ −== +∑ ; (21) 
or, assuming ˆ( ) tE τπ π= : 
1ˆ 1t tV v
π ⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , (22) 
with ( )( 1) 1ˆ ˆ 1t t tπ ψ π ψ π− −= + − . ψ is the weighting parameter (0 < ψ < 1) and ∑== tni ititt s1 ππ . 
Thus, the desired R&D investment rate for the next period, destir )1( + , is determined according to the 
following rule: 
( 1)
( 1) ( 1)
If , ,
If , (1 ) ,
des
it t i t it
des
it t i t i it i t it
V V r r
V V r r rβ β ω
+
+ −
⎧ ≥ =⎪⎨ < = − + +⎪⎩
 (23) 
where ( 1)tr −  is the weighted average R&D expenditure rate in period t-1 ( ∑== tni ititt rsr 1 ), βi is the 
firm-specific parameter that gives the rate of adjustment (0 < βi < 1), and ωit is a random variable. 
According to this rule, if a firm’s performance is not satisfactory (i.e. if it is lower than industry 
average), the R&D effort will increase in the direction of the industry R&D average. 
 Finally, the R&D expenditure rate to be implemented by the firm in the following periods is 
determined. It is assumed that the rate of R&D investment is bounded from above by the unit profit 
before non-production costs, such that the R&D expenditure rate in the next period is given by: 
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3.4. Entry and Exit 
Firms decide whether to continue or to exit and potential entrants decide whether to enter or not. 
We assume that entry and exit barriers are connected to the structural characteristics of the industry, 
given by entry and exit costs, E and X, respectively. (These costs, however, are never set to preclude 
entry or exit of firms.) The entry barriers are determined by the nature of the knowledge base and by 
the properties of the learning processes (Marsili 2001). Exit barriers influence the behaviour of 
firms by imposing non-transferability of specific assets, such as specific skills and accumulated 
knowledge (Caves and Porter 1976). 
 The exit decision is taken in period t, and it is implemented at the beginning of period t+1. 
A firm will decide to stay in the industry if Xitit VV ≥ , that is, if the corresponding net present value 
is higher than the alternative (exit). XitV  is the net present value of an established firm that decides 
to exit and it is given by: 
XV it
X
it −= π . (25) 
Considering (19) and (25), a firm decides to stay if positive profits are expected or if the absolute 
value of expected losses is lower than the exit cost, yielding the following rule: 
( )1
Stay, if ( ) 0
Stay, if ( ) 0 and 1 ( )
Exit, otherwise.
it
it itt
E
E E Xττ
π
π ν π+∞ −= +
>⎧⎪⎪ < + ≤⎨⎪⎪⎩
∑  (26) 
Or, using the condition established in (20): 
( )
ˆ ˆExit, if 0 and
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆExit, if 0 and and
Stay, otherwise.
it it
it it it it
g v
g v v g X
π
π π
π
π π
⎧ < ≥⎪⎪ < < ≥ −⎨⎪⎪⎩
 (27) 
 The number of entrants can be defined in several ways. For example, Llerena and Oltra 
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(2002), Bottazzi, Dosi and Rocchetti (2001) and Winter (1984) define  the number of potential 
entrants as a stochastic Poisson process to then evaluate whether potential entrants become actual 
entrants, while Marsili (2001) defines the number of entrants exogenously, using a constant entry 
rate with a stochastic disturbance. Our implementation is similar to the latter. Thus, we define the 
number of new firms as follows: 
1t t tm nγ −= , (28) 
where mt is the number of entrants in period t (approximated at the nearest integer), γt (γt > 0) is the 
entry rate and nt-1 is the number of established firms in the period t-1. The entry rate is given by a 
normal distribution ( )2~ ,t E ENγ µ σ , with µE = f (E) and f ´< 0 (i.e. γt is decreasing with the level of 
entry barriers). 
 The entry decision is taken in period t and becomes effective at the beginning of period t+1. 
Only established firms are able to improve the current state of technology in the routinized regime, 
while only new firms can do so in the entrepreneurial regime. The productivity level of inputs of 
new firms are thus drawn from a log normal distribution centred on the log of industry average 
productivity (i.e. 1lnµ −=j jet ta ) in the routinized regime, and on the log of best practice observed in 
the industry (i.e. ( ) 1ln 1µ −⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦j j jMet et tg a ) in the entrepreneurial regime ( jMta~  is given by equation 
(17) above; subscript e denotes potential entrant). 
 Whether a potential entrant becomes an actual entrant depends on the evaluation of the 
profit opportunities generated by its technology at the time of entry. The potential entrants can be 
mistaken about the evaluation of the profit opportunity via, namely, a bad judgement of the 
potential productivity level of the technique. The net present value of a potential entrant is given by: 
( )1 1 ( )Eet itV E Eτ ττ ν π∞ −= += + −∑ . (29) 
A potential entrant decides to enter the industry if the (discounted) expected profits are higher than 
the entry cost, that is, if 
( )etE v Eπ > . (30) 
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 The production technique is defined at the outset in case of entry. The full specification of 
the initial characteristics of each firm is therefore required. We assume, in particular, that the entry 
scale is small relative to the size of the market and determined by a normal distribution 
( )2,~ qqet Nq σµ , with tq q<µ . Whether the R&D effort is innovative or imitative is randomly 
determined. The remaining parameters are similar to those for the established firms. 
 
4. Simulation results: the impact of entry and exit on industry productivity growth 
 Our numerical simulation is implemented by using the Laboratory for Simulation 
Development (Lsd) software.9 The main purpose is to evaluate to what extent the model is able to 
replicate some of the stylized empirical regularities on firm dynamics reported in Section 2 above. 
We also want to analyse the specific contribution of market share reallocation to aggregate 
productivity growth. 
 In each technological regime, we consider five separate entry/exit scenarios of 200 
consecutive production periods (quarters). To test for the robustness of our findings with respect to 
model parameterization (the model assumes a considerable number of random parameters), each 
scenario is replicated 100 times, making a total of 100x200 runs per scenario. Either the number of 
production periods or the number of replications could be easily extended, but no substantial gain 
would be obtained. We believe indeed to have generated enough and representative statistics that 
allows us to establish our findings with a comfortable degree of confidence. 
 To begin with, we have the no entry/no exit case as a benchmark implementation. Then, 
using the entry rates reported in Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) and Audretsch and Acs 
(1994), we calibrate the mean of the random entry rate (i.e. µE of γt) to 1.050, 1.075, 1.100, 1.125 
and 1.150% per quarter in the corresponding five routinized regime cases, and 3.800, 3.825, 3.850, 
                                                     
9 Lsd is a simulation package developed by Marco Valente for IIASA (Austria) and for IKE/DRUID (Aalborg 
University, Denmark). See Valente and Andersen (2002). The software is available for free downloading at 
http://www.business.aau.dk/~mv/Lsd/lsd.html. 
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3.875 and 3.900% per quarter in the other five entrepreneurial regime cases. The parameter defining 
exit barriers is assumed to be equal to 2 in the routinized regime (high barriers) and 0 in the 
entrepreneurial regime (low barriers). 
 All other industry and firm parameters are identical across implementations. In particular, 
our exercise considers an initial population of 65 heterogeneous/single-output/single establishment 
firms with distinct R&D intensity and productivity levels. To simplify, the production technology 
uses only two inputs, with the initial productivity level of input 1 ranging from 0.868 to 1.101, and 
from 1.536 to 1.745 in the case of input 2. The corresponding averages are equal to 0.999 and 
1.643. The initial R&D rate per unit of sales ranges between 0.5 and 9.0%, with an average equal to 
4.77%. The average initial market share is identical for all firms and equal to 0.0154 (or 1/65). As in 
the Nelson-Winter model, we assumed a ‘mature’ market with a unit elastic (inverse) demand given 
by 65t tP Q= . The values of parameters are presented in Appendixes A and B. 
 
4.1. Analysing the evolution of industry 
So how does the model fare in terms of its ability to replicate the empirical regularities on firm 
dynamics documented in Section 2? Table 1 shows the selected industry statistics generated by each 
industry configuration. Clearly, the final number of firms is (11 to 15 percent) higher in the 
entrepreneurial regime than in the routinized regime, either in terms of the average over the entire 
production cycle (200 periods) or at the final period (i.e. at t=200). The Herfindahl equivalent 
number of firms index shows in turn that market concentration is higher in the routinesed regime 
than in the entrepreneurial regime. At t=200, for example, there are between 113.7 and 114.4 
‘equivalent’ firms in the routinized regime, and 119.7 to 138.9 in the entrepreneurial regime. The 
corresponding standard deviations are also considerably higher in the latter. 
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Table 1: Selected industry statistics 
Routinized regime Entrepreneurial regime 
Entry parameters 
 
No entry-
No exit 0.01050 0.01075 0.01100 0.01125 0.01150 0.03800 0.03825 0.03850 0.03875 0.03900 
Average over 200 periods            
Number of firms 65.00 111.42 111.45 111.43 111.46 111.48 127.35 123.74 126.15 128.32 126.16 
  (9.098) (9.125) (9.136) (9.188) (9.165) (30.461) (23.469) (28.159) (48.271) (29.926) 
Herfindahl index (inverse) 55.65 105.79 105.84 105.80 105.82 105.82 120.39 117.60 119.84 121.48 119.99 
 (3.329) (7.425) (7.472) (7.461) (7.496) (7.495) (24.116) (19.755) (25.068) (45.146) (26.163) 
Hymer-Pashingian index 0.008 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.032 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) 
Entry rate (per quarter) -- 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) 
Exit rate (per quarter) -- 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.042) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) 
Final period (t = 200)            
Number of firms 65.00 123.57 123.18 123.54 123.68 123.39 147.47 135.76 144.15 163.03 143.84 
  (3.723) (3.888) (4.580) (4.895) (4.880) (61.691) (35.395) (41.729) (108.632) (55.700) 
Herfindahl index (inverse) 51.84 114.39 114.02 114.13 114.15 113.74 126.46 119.65 122.32 138.85 124.45 
 (1.79) (3.749) (3.525) (4.148) (4.354) (4.755) (40.064) (32.587) (32.517) (101.369) (34.251) 
Hymer-Pashingian index 0.005 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.036 0.042 0.030 0.032 0.035 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.062) (0.088) (0.017) (0.049) (0.053) 
Entry rate (per quarter) -- 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.047 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) 
Exit rate (per quarter) -- 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.040 0.035 0.029 0.038 0.042 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.083) (0.075) (0.021) (0.070) (0.072) 
Notes: Average over 100 simulation runs for each industry configuration. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
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 Comparing with no entry/no exit scenario, all 10 selected scenarios generate larger rates of 
turbulence. As shown by the Hymer-Pashingian index (line 3, panels a) and b), columns 3 and 8), 
3.2% of the total market share, on average, are transferred across firms in the entrepreneurial 
regime, while in the routinized regime this figure is only 2.4%.10 In the no entry/no exit scenario, 
this reallocation rate does not exceed 0.8%. There is, therefore, one third more turbulence in the 
entrepreneurial regime than in the routinized regime, a pattern very close to the one found by 
Audretsch and Acs (1990). 
 Much of the market turbulence is of course linked to the entry and exit of firms. As Table 2 
shows, the annual entry and exit rates are quite distinct in the two technological regimes.11  For 
example, the entrepreneurial regime yields an annual entry rate of 13.5% and an exit rate of 12.0% 
(averages over the 200 periods), while for the routinized regime the corresponding entry and exit 
rates are 2.9% and 1.8%. This finding confirms some stylised facts, according to which many 
industries, especially those closer to the routinized regime, show average annual entry rates lower 
than 3%, while other industries, closer to the entrepreneurial regime, exhibit entry rates higher than 
12% (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1988; Geroski, 1991; Baldwin, 1995). 
 
                                                     
10 The Hymer-Pashingian instability index, It, is an indicator of market turbulence, and it is computed as the 
sum of one-period variations in absolute value in firms’ market shares: ∑ = −−= tni tiitt ssI 1 )1(  or 
∑∑∑ = −== − −+−= ttt xec x txe etc tcctt ssssI 1 )1(11 )1( , where c denotes continuing firms, e new firms, and x exiting 
firms. 
11 Entry and exit rates are computed using the method suggested by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988). 
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Table 2: Annual entry and exit rates 
Routinized regime Entrepreneurial regime 
Entry parameters 
 0.01050 0.01075 0.01100 0.01125 0.01150 0.03800 0.03825 0.03850 0.03875 0.03900 
Average over 50 years           
Entry rate 0.0288 0.0290 0.0294 0.0298 0.0303 0.1340 0.1339 0.1353 0.1360 0.1369 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.019) (0.017) 
Exit rate 0.0173 0.0176 0.0179 0.0182 0.0188 0.1174 0.1199 0.1200 0.1197 0.1216 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.072) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) 
Final period           
Entry rate 0.0233 0.0236 0.0259 0.0274 0.0288 0.1341 0.1343 0.1367 0.1388 0.1396 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.023) 
Exit rate 0.0202 0.0203 0.0205 0.0231 0.0258 0.1270 0.1270 0.1324 0.1283 0.1238 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.160) (0.119) (0.133) (0.121) (0.130) 
Notes: Averages over 100 simulation runs for each industry configuration. The rates are defined as the ratio of entrants (exiting firms) in t to the total number of firms 
in t-1. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
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Table 3: Survival rate of new firms (in percentage) 
 Years after birth 
 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years 9 years 10 years 
Routinized regime           
Entry parameter 0.01050 86.4 83.1 80.1 77.1 74.1 71.4 68.6 65.8 63.3 60.7 
  0.01075 86.7 83.4 80.2 77.2 74.2 71.4 68.6 65.7 63.1 60.5 
  0.01100 86.5 83.1 80.0 76.8 73.9 70.8 68.1 65.1 62.5 59.9 
  0.01125 86.3 82.8 79.4 76.2 73.3 70.4 67.7 64.9 62.3 59.7 
  0.01150 86.4 82.8 79.3 76.0 72.8 70.0 67.3 64.3 61.7 59.1 
Entrepreneurial regime           
Entry parameter 0.03800 83.5 70.6 59.6 50.5 43.1 36.7 31.5 27.1 23.4 20.4 
  0.03825 83.5 70.5 59.5 50.3 42.8 36.4 31.3 26.9 23.3 20.2 
  0.03850 83.0 70.2 59.4 50.2 42.6 36.2 31.0 26.7 23.0 19.9 
  0.03875 83.4 70.4 59.2 50.0 42.3 36.1 30.8 26.5 22.9 19.8 
  0.03900 83.5 70.3 59.2 49.8 42.2 35.7 30.5 26.2 22.5 19.4 
Notes: Averages over 100 simulation runs for each industry configuration. The survival rate is defined as the number of new firms surviving in a given year after birth, 
as a percentage of the total number of new firms. 
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 Entry and exit are highly positively correlated. This correlation is determined, in the first 
instance, by the rate of early mortality of new firms, which is very high in both technological 
regimes. Table 3 provides the distribution of the number of production periods in which newly 
created firms operate before closing. Around 14% of new firms close within the first year (i.e. 
before four production periods) in the routinized regime, while in the entrepreneurial regime the 
corresponding figure is approximately 17%. Ten years after birth, 60% of entrants are still in 
operation in the routinized regime. The corresponding rate in the entrepreneurial regime is only 
20%. This of course confirms the stylised fact that early mortality among entrants is particularly 
high in the entrepreneurial regime, as found by Geroski (1991), Audretsch (1991), Mata, Portugal 
and Guimarães (1995) and Baldwin (1995). 
 
4.2. Firm dynamics and industry-level productivity growth 
The next issue is whether all the generated firm mobility implies a higher aggregate productivity 
growth. Let us first compare the productivity growth across the two technological regimes. Figure 2 
plots the evolution of aggregate productivity. (Individual productivity levels are weighted by the 
corresponding market shares.) Both technological regimes generate a higher Fisher index of 
productivity than in no entry/no exit scenario: the final period productivity index is, respectively, 
152.5 and 167.6 in the routinized and entrepreneurial regimes, and only 136.3 in the case of no 
entry/no exit (base 100 at t=0). Converting into annual average growth rates, this is equivalent to 
1.04, 0.85, and 0.62%, respectively. 
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Figure 2: Industry productivity 
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Notes: Base 100 at t=0. Prod00000-Prod03875 denote the industry productivity index associated with the 
corresponding mean of the random entry rate (see Appendix A). 
 
 
 As Figure 3 and Table 4 show, the ‘technological space’ is exploited differently across the 
two types of technological regimes. In the first place, dispersion in productivity levels is higher in 
the entrepreneurial regime than in the routinezed regime. (The lowest dispersion is in the no 
entry/no exit scenario.) The productivity distribution is left-skewed in the case of routinized regime, 
with a long tail in the negative direction (i.e. the mean is lower than the median – the negative 
skewness is indeed between -3.48 and -3.26). In the entrepreneurial regime, in contrast, the 
distributions are weakly right-skewed. The maximum productivity level in the routinized regime is 
also much closer to the third quantile than in the entrepreneurial regime case. Thus, the more 
concentrated productivity distribution on top values in the former case does not result in a higher 
average productivity growth rate. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of the final period productivity of firms 
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Note:  Pooling of 100 simulations (final period). 
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Table 4: Distribution of the final period productivity of firms 
Routinized regime Entrepreneurial regime 
Entry parameters 
 
No entry-
No exit 0.01050 0.01075 0.01100 0.01125 0.01150 0.03800 0.03825 0.03850 0.03875 0.03900 
Average 202.79 227.61 227.64 228.12 228.04 228.15 242.58 241.20 244.09 239.94 240.42 
Standard deviation 15.95  19.70  19.93  19.52  19.83  19.86  26.09  23.35  25.25  23.91  25.96 
Minimum 80.96  96.15  96.52  95.66  96.74  98.46  98.82 105.54 107.32 103.66 104.40 
First quantile 204.98 221.99 221.97 222.07 222.07 222.17 227.59 226.54 227.29 225.58 227.02 
Median 206.84 230.93 231.18 231.50 231.73 232.33 238.97 235.80 237.80 233.02 234.73 
Third quantile 207.88 238.87 238.91 239.93 239.71 239.68 257.32 253.50 258.26 252.55 254.92 
Maximum 211.97 257.12 254.07 255.20 257.69 255.11 363.53 332.92 341.60 339.05 340.01 
Note:  Pooling of 100 simulations (final period). 
 
Table 5: Net market share transferred from closings and contractions to openings and expansions, over 5-year period (in percentage) 
Routinized regime Entrepreneurial regime 
Entry parameters 
 
No entry-
No exit 0.01050 0.01075 0.01100 0.01125 0.01150 0.03800 0.03825 0.03850 0.03875 0.03900 
Average of 5-year periods 4.91 12.49 12.63 12.80 12.98 13.28 50.71 51.02 51.15 51.21 52.15 
 (1.20) (2.03) (2.05) (2.04) (2.04) (2.08) (6.12) (5.93) (6.43) (6.08) (6.31) 
Notes: Averages over nine 5-year periods. The corresponding values by period are available upon request (Appendix Table 5A). Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
 
 28
 
 Successful firms exclude unsuccessful ones and the result is a considerable resource 
reallocation and, hopefully, increased aggregate productivity growth. As Table 5 shows, the market 
share transferred from exiting and contracting units to entering and expanding units, over a 5-year 
period, was 12 to 13% in the routinized regime. The corresponding rate in the entrepreneurial 
regime is an astonishing 51 to 52%, while in the no entry/no exit scenario, the market share 
reallocation is very small at 5%. 
 In order to disaggregate the contribution of firm dynamics to industry productivity growth, 
the population of firms in each 5-year period was divided into four groups: continuing firms with 
increasing market shares, continuing firms with decreasing market shares, exiting firms, and 
entering firms. In each group we then computed the proportion of firms with a productivity index 
higher than the average/median productivity of continuing firms. For completeness, the productivity 
of entering firms was also compared with the productivity of exiting firms. These statistics are 
presented in Tables 6 and 7. The reported values are the averages over a time-span of 9 consecutive 
5-year periods (i.e. over a total of 180 runs in each replication).12 Since we are mostly interested in 
long-run effects, the first 5-year period was dropped from the analysis. 
 Table 6 shows that entrants are at least as productive as continuing firms. In the routinized 
regime, 67 to 68% of entrants show a productivity-level above the (beginning-period) average of 
continuing firms (line 1, columns 1-5). In the case of the entrepreneurial regime, only roughly one 
half of entering firms are more productive than the continuing firms average (line 1, columns 6-10), 
but they are clearly more productive than the average of exiting firms (measured at the beginning-
period) and the median of continuing firms (lines 2 and 3, columns 6-10). 
 
                                                     
12 The corresponding values by period are available on request (Appendix Tables 6A-E and 7A-H). 
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Table 6: Proportion of entrants (exits) with higher (lower) productivity than average/median productivity of continuing firms (in percentage) 
Routinized regime Entrepreneurial regime 
Entry parameters 
 0.01050 0.01075 0.01100 0.01125 0.01150 0.03800 0.03825 0.03850 0.03875 0.03900 
New firms with a productivity index 
higher than: 
          
 continuing firms’ average 66.87 66.99 66.95 67.72 68.12 47.22 47.03 47.33 47.07 48.53 
 (14.57) (14.90) (15.34) (15.31) (15.36) (39.89) (39.00) (39.55) (39.72) (40.25) 
 continuing firms’ median  40.70 41.02 41.13 42.32 43.34 60.87 58.58 59.41 61.09 62.89 
 (21.31) (21.60) (21.27) (21.41) (21.18) (37.54) (37.90) (37.80) (37.56) (37.09) 
 exiting firms’ average 47.47 48.01 47.71 50.15 49.90 75.30 75.58 72.97 74.75 76.15 
 (28.42) (28.28) (28.52) (27.87) (27.10) (32.60) (32.11) (33.36) (32.37) (31.73) 
Exiting firms with a productivity index 
lower than: 
          
 continuing firms’ average  67.91 67.45 68.39 67.97 68.75 92.93 93.12 93.01 93.12 93.22 
 (18.69) (18.81) (18.07) (18.30) (18.07) (5.11) (4.90) (5.24 5.06) 5.07) 
 continuing firms’ median  74.96 74.98 74.98 74.95 75.69 93.12 93.28 93.26 93.25 93.44 
 (17.09) 17.73) (16.85) (17.51) (16.72) (4.81) (4.71) (4.93) (4.85) (4.82) 
Notes: Averages over nine 5-year periods. The group of entering (exiting) firms comprises all firms that enter (exit) in a given period. Simultaneous entry and exit 
within any period is precluded. The reported values are obtained by dividing the number of entrants (exits) with a higher (lower) productivity index than the 
corresponding average of continuing firms by the total number of observed entrants (exits). The productivity index of continuing firms is measured at the beginning-
period in the case of new firms and at the ending-period in the case of exits. The corresponding values by period are available upon request (Appendix Tables 5A-E). 
Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
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Table 7: Proportion of continuing firms with increasing (decreasing) market shares with higher (lower) productivity than average and median 
productivity of whole continuing firms group (in percentage) 
Routinized regime Entrepreneurial regime 
Entry parameters 
 0.01050 0.01075 0.01100 0.01125 0.01150 0.03800 0.03825 0.03850 0.03875 0.03900 
Continuing firms with increasing market 
shares and productivity above: 
          
 continuing firms’ average at t-1 97.10 97.06 96.95 97.01 97.02 83.99 83.93 83.08 82.96 81.79 
 (6.44) (6.44) (6.80) (6.77) (7.68) (24.82) (24.52) (25.03) (25.80) (26.96) 
 continuing firms’ average at t 87.60 87.82 87.64 87.99 88.37 85.03 84.71 83.24 83.03 83.29 
 (13.22) (13.18) (13.30) (13.08) (13.23) (21.48) (21.73) (22.92) (23.57) (23.59) 
 continuing firms’ median at t-1 83.68 83.63 83.42 83.58 83.37 80.42 80.19 79.58 80.23 77.71 
 (14.34) (14.36) (14.64) (14.82) (14.98) (27.13) (27.23) (27.21) (27.32) (29.26) 
 continuing firms’ median at t 60.41 60.32 59.94 59.92 59.93 76.30 76.27 76.20 76.00 73.77 
 (18.38) (18.51) (18.85) (19.05) (18.75) (27.95) (28.16) (28.01) (27.99) (29.43) 
Continuing firms with decreasing market 
shares and productivity below: 
          
 continuing firms’ average at t-1 39.10 38.99 38.60 38.42 38.14 54.01 54.68 55.61 54.01 54.01 
 (18.00) (18.04) (17.83) (17.63) (17.72) (33.15) (33.44) (33.88) (33.12) (34.06) 
 continuing firms’ average at t 52.89 52.82 52.47 52.38 52.36 68.26 68.73 69.50 68.88 67.56 
 (14.31) (14.30) (14.18) (14.25) (14.35) (24.01) (24.48) (24.13) (23.99) (25.11) 
 continuing firms’ median at t-1 52.47 52.32 51.85 51.85 51.79 46.62 48.24 48.02 46.98 48.16 
 (15.89) (15.88) (15.56) (15.59) (15.64) (29.18) (29.40) (29.98) (29.82) (29.37) 
 continuing firms' median at t 59.45 59.35 58.94 58.98 58.96 60.77 62.91 62.82 60.98 61.69 
 (11.13) (11.09) (10.87) (11.00) (10.86) (24.77) (24.18) (24.56) (25.62) (24.57) 
Notes: Averages over nine 5-year periods. The group of continuing firms comprises all firms that remain active over a given period. In this group, firms were divided 
into two categories: those with an increasing market share and those with a decreasing market share. The proportions reported in the table for each group are then 
obtained dividing the number of firms with a higher productivity level than the average of continuing firms by the total number of observed firms in the corresponding 
category. The corresponding values by period are available upon request (Appendix Tables 5A-E). Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
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The exiting firms are also strongly concentrated in the less productive lot in both 
technological regimes. In the routinized regime, 67 to 69% of exiting firms have a productivity level 
below the (ending-period) average of continuing firms; approximately 75% are below the median. 
These proportions are larger in the entrepreneurial regime: approximately 93% in both cases. On the 
whole there is therefore no shadow of doubt that exits have been replaced by new and more 
productive firms, substantiating a significant and positive entry-exit effect on industry productivity 
growth, especially in the entrepreneurial regime case. 
 Table 7 looks at continuing firms with increasing/decreasing market shares in detail. At 
first sight it seems that most firms which are gaining market share are also more productive. In the 
routinized regime, for example, 83 to 84% of firms with increasing market shares belong to the 
(beginning-period) top 50 per cent most productive continuing firms (line 3, columns 1-5), while 
approximately 97% of those firms have a productivity level above the continuing firms average 
(lines 1, columns 1-5). The percentage is even higher in the entrepreneurial regime case, at 78 to 
82% and 82 to 84%, respectively (lines 3 and 1, columns 5-10). Symmetrically, continuing firms 
with decreasing market shares are in general less productive. In the case of the routinized regime, 
for example, approximately 59% of firms that are losing market share are located in (ending-period) 
50 per cent less productive segment, while in the entrepreneurial regime this proportion is 61 to 
63%. It is therefore quite clear that resource reallocation among continuing firms plays a substantial 
role on aggregate productivity growth, especially in the routinized regime case. 
 On the whole, this decomposition of productivity growth shows that exits and contraction 
do occur among less productivity units, while entry and expansion are concentrated among more 
efficient units. It follows therefore that our modelling was quite effective in replicating some major 
stylized facts of industry dynamics, including a very strong impact of entry-exit mechanism on 
aggregate productivity growth. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 This paper examines industry dynamics as a source of aggregate productivity growth in two 
alternative technological regimes. Our evolutionary approach assumes that individual firms learn 
about technology through a variety of sources, and that, as a consequence, productivity growth and 
market shares across firms can be quite distinct. Aggregate productivity growth in this framework is 
thus determined by the micro productivity patterns associated with different technological regimes, 
on the one hand, and the ease of entry/exit, on the other. 
 Our numerical simulations do replicate key empirical regularities already reported in 
literature. In particular, they show that firm mobility has a very strong impact on industry 
productivity growth: firms that gain market share are the ones among the most productive lot, while 
continuing firms with decreasing market shares are in the bottom half of the distribution in terms of 
efficiency; exiting firms also tend to be replaced by new and more productive firms. It is therefore 
very clear that firm dynamics do matter both in terms of micro and aggregate productivity growth.  
We also confirmed that the entry-exit effect is more dominant in the entrepreneurial regime, 
while the impact of resource reallocation among continuing firms is larger in the routinized regime. 
Not surprisingly, given that in the former the competition between the innovative entrants and the 
established firms is more head-to-head, the industry-level productivity growth is higher than in the 
latter. 
On the whole, our results suggest that micro analysis is the proper complement to aggregate 
industry studies, as it provides a considerable insight into the causes of productivity growth. As to 
the policy implications of our analysis are concerned, the lesson seems to be quite straightforward: 
it claims for the promotion of an institutional environment more favourable to resource reallocation 
through entry and exit of firms in order to achieve a higher rate of production efficiency.
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Appendix A. Industry parameter settings: 
Technological regime Parameter Description 
Routinized  Entrepreneurial  
D Demand coefficient 65 65 
v Discount rate 0.1 0.1 
δ Intensity of the selection mechanism 0.1 0.1 
w1 and w2 Price of inputs 0.1 and 0.5 0.1 and 0.5 
θ, ρ and φ Parameters weighting past values 0.5 0.5 
β Adjustment rate of R&D 0.5 0.5 
bN Technological opportunities to innovate 5.3 5.3 
bM Technological opportunities to imitate 11.3 11.3 
σ S.D. of innovative draws 0.006 0.006 
gmax Maximum rate of innovative draws 0.01 0.01 
µE Mean of random entry rate 0.0105; 0.01075; 0.011; 
0.01125; 0.0115 
0.038; 0.03825; 0.0385; 
0.03875; 0.039 
σE S.D. of random entry rate 0.001 0.004 
X Exit barrier 2 0 
 
Appendix B. Firm parameters (for the two technological regimes): 
Initial productivity of input 1: a1 = {1.0991 0.929228 0.993226 0.999833 1.04484 0.945796 1.01556 1.02504 
1.00675 0.973121 0.925113 1.01671 0.953578 0.985178 1.04245 0.934288 1.0473 0.966943 
0.918181 1.00295 1.00663 1.06109 0.978114 0.868066 0.917641 0.999854 1.10119 1.03197 1.04458 
0.977986 1.01237 0.996525 1.02672 1.01125 1.09296 1.03496 1.02052 1.05661 1.04263 1.04209 
0.996295 0.928016 0.984648 0.972298 1.04867 1.04974 1.00187 0.882119 1.04836 0.986049 
1.01821 1.00929 1.00738 0.959658 1.01327 1.0635 1.03081 1.02015 0.956651 0.905239 0.974466 
0.955911 0.993446 0.980341 0.999548} 
Initial productivity of input 2: a2 = {1.6748 1.58718 1.67204 1.74477 1.64776 1.68122 1.6271 1.72348 
1.67377 1.61058 1.69891 1.63541 1.67465 1.69544 1.62376 1.6837 1.6786 1.65646 1.62994 1.72163 
1.67919 1.56711 1.53568 1.65505 1.57418 1.6539 1.58759 1.62937 1.6023 1.61133 1.72763 1.60602 
1.6511 1.64455 1.63939 1.65958 1.68059 1.61299 1.6221 1.63791 1.67567 1.62071 1.64737 1.58857 
1.60842 1.68473 1.56586 1.66965 1.70013 1.70271 1.62711 1.57017 1.61791 1.57716 1.68099 
1.5866 1.60789 1.62867 1.74547 1.66272 1.72141 1.58121 1.64182 1.56648 1.59843} 
Initial R&D expenditure rate per unit of sales: r = {0.0641965 0.0503617 0.0344462 0.0431363 0.0731603 
0.0622908 0.0199951 0.0497315 0.0289174 0.0620039 0.0509556 0.0680779 0.0541377 0.0462283 
0.047612 0.03144 0.025664 0.0562811 0.066097 0.033032 0.0362245 0.0269913 0.0579717 
0.0510349 0.0255884 0.0558446 0.0643353 0.0378444 0.0309043 0.0412489 0.0425808 0.0657927 
0.0669956 0.0555556 0.0196003 0.0818574 0.0145982 0.0457228 0.067336 0.0608757 0.00574432 
0.0167786 0.0649273 0.0276446 0.0682775 0.0868907 0.0481435 0.0296261 0.0680171 0.0499932 
0.0617636 0.0770782 0.0458726 0.0611841 0.037955 0.0629541 0.0617017 0.0428776 0.0672116 
0.0234899 0.0164829 0.0150083 0.0399822 0.044859 0.0576941} 
Initial share of R&D allocated to innovation: α = {0.27421 0.460697 0.783865 0.860226 0.983236 0.843975 
0.582421 0.986503 0.75171 0.60564 0.117437 0.150394 0.944753 0.556836 0.0220837 0.642979 
0.670098 0.917848 0.446023 0.707826 0.817101 0.266613 0.70695 0.584787 0.695679 0.544023 
0.163081 0.528548 0.160749 0.626861 0.782992 0.436638 0.446866 0.00634169 0.903301 0.680562 
0.746679 0.343818 0.460434 0.37191 0.52096 0.659053 0.00934752 0.686102 0.0706349 0.720768 
0.103797 0.00425392 0.160274 0.70932 0.215826 0.588119 0.389731 0.246733 0.279293 0.0668498 
0.297022 0.54171 0.385769 0.833682 0.518478 0.0552788 0.813266 0.542393 0.0574753} 
Initial market share: s = {0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 
0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 
0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 
0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 
0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 
0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 
0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385 0.015385} 
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